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Abstract. The Internet of Things makes possible to connect each ev-
eryday object to the Internet, making computing pervasive like never
before. From a security and privacy perspective, this tsunami of connec-
tivity represents a disaster, which makes each object remotely hackable.
We claim that, in order to tackle this issue, we need to address a new
challenge in security: education.
1 The IoT Tsunami
In the last decade, we all have witnessed a turmoil of interest around the Inter-
net of Things (IoT) paradigm. It has been claimed that such a paradigm may
revolution our daily lives and pervasive applications are behind the corner both
in the civil and military complex. Such a strong hype on pervasive technologies
requires a step back to consider the potential threat on security and privacy.
First of all, What exactly is the IoT? Accordingly to the Online Oxford Dictio-
nary it is the “interconnection via the Internet of computing devices embedded
in everyday objects, enabling them to send and receiving data”. To get a grasp
of the dimension of this phenomenon, according to Evans Data Corporation the
estimated population of IoT devices in June 2016 was 6.2 billion [1], number that
according to several predictions will grow as up as 20 billion in 2020 [2]. Projec-
tions and data are not so straightforward to analyse since some firms take into
account devices like smartphones, while others do not count them, therefore it
is quite hard to make comparisons. Nonetheless, the growing trend is confirmed
by every analyst, to the point that by 2025 the IoT market could be worth $3.9
trillion to $11 trillion per year [3]. On the academic front, this ongoing excite-
ment and interest in all the IoT world has given rise to an increasing number
of related conferences, research projects and research centres (like the recently
formed IoT Center in Denmark, http://iotcenter.dk).
As a matter of fact, even though IoT refers to an ample variety of different
devices, these devices all share a common architecture. First of all, any IoT device
usually connects to the Internet through a more powerful gateway, which could
be a smartphone or a tablet. Then data flow is elaborated by (and eventually
hosted into) the cloud, enabling the end user to remotely connect to the device
and control it. Figure 1 shows how this IoT architecture looks like in a generic
scenario.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
7.
08
38
0v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
6 J
ul 
20
17
2 Nicola Dragoni, Alberto Giaretta and Manuel Mazzara
Fig. 1. Overview of a generic IoT architecture
IoT applications span from industrial automation to home area networks and
personal (body) area networks. In particular, Smart homes will heavily rely upon
IoT devices to monitor the house temperature, eventual gas leakages, malicious
intrusions and several other parameters concerning the house and its inhabi-
tants. Another growing area of interest is represented by pervasive healthcare
applications, which use IoT devices to perform continuous biological monitoring,
drug administration, elderly monitoring and so on. Last, but not least, in the
recent years wearable devices gained a huge popularity (e.g., fitness trackers), to
the point that in the span of just a year sales grew 18.4% in 2016 [4].
1.1 A Security and Privacy Disaster
From a security perspective, this ongoing excitement for IoT is having tremen-
dous consequences, so that it’s not an exaggeration to talk about a security and
privacy disaster. Indeed, if the fundamental IoT axiom states that “everything
can be connected to the Internet (becoming, in this way, an IoT device)”, its
security corollary is somehow catastrophic: “everything that can be connected
to the Internet can be hacked” [5]. This is particularly critical if we consider
that, by means of the various kinds of devices connected to the Internet, people
are sharing more and more information about themselves, often without being
aware of that. This means that the amount of data available online is going to
increase unrelentingly, literally given away to cybercriminal eager to take con-
trol of our devices, and thus of our life. In the early days of the “IoT shift”,
researchers highlighted how much critical security would be in a real IoT con-
text [6] and gave some hints about what should be done to defend our devices
and our privacy. This message has clearly not been listened.
To put things in perspective, in July 2014 HP Security Research [7] analysed
10 of the most popular IoT devices on the market revealing a generally alarming
situation:
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– 90% of devices collected at least some information via the device;
– 80% of devices, along with their cloud and mobile components, did non
require a password complex enough;
– 70% of devices, along with their cloud and mobile components, enabled an
attacker to identify valid user accounts through enumeration;
– 70% of devices used unencrypted network services;
– 6 out of 10 devices that provided user interfaces were vulnerable to a range
of weaknesses, such as persistent XSS1 and weak credentials.
To make matters worse, security in a IoT scenario is even harder than expected
for a number of reasons [8], such as:
– It implies complex and distributed systems, with a huge variety of different
operating sistems, programming languages and hardware;
– Even developing a simple application for a IoT device can be non-trivial;
– Securing the applications is even less easy, because the attack surface is enor-
mous (any device could be a possible entry point) and defining beforehand
all the potential threats is extremely challenging;
– The contained data are sensitive and highly valuable for the market, nowa-
days, which entails huge potential gains for any successful attacker and high
attractiveness.
Given that providing security for the IoT is still a really hard thing to do, the
atavistic problem with exciting new technologies is that companies are in a hurry
and most of them ignore quite at all any kind of security issues, postponing the
matter as much as possible. Just to give some numbers, Capgemini Consulting
in 2015 highlighted some critical aspects [9], such as:
– Only 48% of organizations focus on security of their devices from the begin-
ning of the development phase;
– Only 49% of organizations provide remote updates for their devices;
– Only 20% hire IoT security experts;
– Only 35% invite third parties (like hackers) to identify vulnerabilities in their
devices.
As a rule of thumb, we could depict the prevalent approach of manufacturers
to IoT security with the following “insecurity practice” rule [8]:
Development Rush + Hard to Develop
⇒ Skip (or Postpone) Security (1)
At this point it should be quite easy to detect the reasons why hackers actu-
ally love the on-going IoT outburst. In the following Sections, we will show plenty
of examples about this vast attention, with focus on two of the most promising
IoT contexts: smart homes (Section 2) and pervasive healthcare (Section 3).
1 Cross site scripting (XSS) is an attack that injects malicious code into a Web appli-
cation.
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2 Smart Home... Of Horror!
Smart homes and, in general, smart buildings are one of the current trends for
IoT devices, and probably the most active one. Our team is also currently en-
gaged in a project on microservice-based IoT for smart buildings [10,11]. Every-
day things are being transformed into much more powerful and smart objects, in
order to meet customers’ increasing needs. But availability of connected things
could come with a high price in terms of privacy and security issues, in light of
the fact that at the present moment too many things are too easily hackable.
Few years ago some irons imported from China included a wireless chip that
was able to spread viruses by connecting to unprotected Wi-Fi networks, while
some other hidden chips were able to use companies networks to spread spam
on the Internet. Researchers achieved to hack the remote firmware update of a
Canon Pixma printer, which makes possible to do funny things, like installing an
old-school videogame such as Doom, and not so funny other ones, like installing
a crippling malware that could even force the device to destroy itself.
Smart light bulbs, which enable the owners to remotely control and adjust
their home light through an app or a web interface, are another fitting example
of IoT devices. Some of these bulbs, such as the popular Philips Hues, have been
compromised and researchers showed how easy is to set up a car, or even a drone,
that drives in a residential area aiming to infect as much bulbs as possible with
a crippling malware. This malware is able to shut them down or even force them
to flicker on and off at desired speed [12].
Smart TVs sales are constantly growing all over the world. Smart TVs provide
a combination of a traditional TV and a Internet-connected personal computer,
blending the two worlds into a single device. Usually these devices are equipped
with various components, such as microphones and webcams, aiming to give the
user the fullest experience possible. Clearly enough, if security is badly managed
in these kind of devices, hackers could easily eavesdrop and peek at our lives
without us even noticing that. An attack that could likely be struck is a HTML5
browser-based attack, therefore the devices resilience should always be assessed
by using some penetration testing frameworks, such as BeEF [13].
Talking about spying, there are other devices that have been hacked with
the specific intent to gather information about us. For instance, baby monitors
are very unsafe devices, since that manufacturers generally equip them with
default passwords easily guessable by attackers, passwords that usually are never
changed by the customers. New York’s Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA)
issued a public statement [14] to inform people about the issue, even reporting
that some parents walked in their child’s room and heard some stranger speaking
to them down the monitor.
Another perfect candidate to become a common IoT device in our smart
home is the thermostat. Being able to remotely choose and monitor our house
temperature can greatly benefit our wellness and comfort. Nonetheless, issues can
arise too as shown by researchers at Black Hat USA, which demonstrated that a
Nest thermostat (a popular device in the USA) could be hacked in less than 15
second if physically accessible by a hacker. The violated thermostat could be used
The Internet of Hackable Things 5
to spy the residents, steal credentials and even infect other appliances. Recently,
other researchers made a proof-of-concept ransomware that could remotely infect
the aforementioned thermostat and shut down the heating, until the victim gives
in to blackmail [15]. Similar vulnerabilities have been found in many other smart
home devices, where connectivity has been “embedded” in the device without
considering any security protection.
Even more serious is the threat posed by the lack of security in top-selling
home alarm systems, which unveiled weaknesses are critical to such an extent
that a malicious attacker could easily control the whole system, suppressing the
alarms or creating multiple false alarms. In fact, some of these systems do not
encrypt nor authenticate the signals sent from the sensors to the control panel,
easily enabling a third party to manipulate the data flow.
Life-threatening vulnerabilities have been found even in smart cars. Security
researchers at Keen Security Lab were able to hack a Tesla Model S, achieving
to disrupt from a distance of 12 miles various electronically controlled features
of the car, such as the brakes, the door locks and the dashboard computer screen
[16].
Last but not least, we have seen a proliferation of wearable health trackers
in the last couple of years. In order to provide the user its monitoring features,
a fitness tracker is an embedded system which collects sensitive data about the
wearer and communicates it to a mobile application by means of a Bluetooth Low
Energy (BLE) protocol, hence enabling the user to access the gathered informa-
tion. Moreover, nowadays most of the mobile applications sync the collected data
to a cloud service, whenever an Internet connection is available (see Figure 1).
Researchers conducted some deeper investigations about this whole system [17],
evaluating the security of the implemented protocols in two of the most popular
fitness trackers on the market. The research highlighted how vulnerable these
devices are to several kinds of attacks, from Denial of Service (DoS) attacks that
can prevent the devices from correctly working, to Man-In-The-Middle (MITM)
attacks based on two fake certificates [18] resulting in a disclosure of sensitive
data. Worryingly, the implemented attacks can be struck by any consumer-level
device equipped with just bluetooth and Wi-Fi capabilities (no advanced hacking
tools have been required).
If you think that escaping from a hacked smart home to find some peace in
a hotel room is a temporary solution, well you might be wrong. Recently, guests
of a top-level hotel in Austria were locked in or out of their rooms because of a
ransomware that hit the hotel’s IT system. The hotel had no choice left except
paying the attackers.
3 Pervasive Healthcare
If the so-far depicted Smart Home scenario is already scary, things can even get
worse when we look at the pervasive healthcare context, for example the the
infrastructure to support elderlies developed by our team [19]. Indeed, when we
talk about security in healthcare we inherently talk about safety, since malfunc-
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tioning, attacks and lack of service could endanger many lives, as we will show
in the following.
3.1 eHealth: How to Remotely Get Big Data
Duo Security highlighted how security is badly managed in healthcare corpo-
rations, showing that the density of Windows XP computers is 4 times greater
than the density of machines running the same OS found, for instance, in fi-
nance. Given that Microsoft ended the support to Windows XP since 2014, this
means that an enormous quantity of devices has not been updated for 2 years,
at least. Not only obsolete operating systems, even additional (and most of the
times, useless) software can become a problem: many healthcare endpoints and
healthcare customers’ terminals have Flash and Java installed, entailing a huge
risk of vulnerabilities exploitation.
To get an idea of how much valuable eHealth data is, and consequently how
critical the related security is, the global information service Experian estimated
that on the black market health records are worth up to 10 times more than
credit card numbers. Particularly, a single eHealth record (which comprises social
security number, address, kids, jobs and so on) can be priced as high as $500.
For the sake of clarity, we are definitely talking about risks which are far from
theoretical: healthcare industry suffers estimated costs of $5.6 billion per single
year because of data thefts and systems malfunctioning. According to [20], in
February 2015 78.8 million of Anthem customers were hacked. In the same year,
according to the Office of Civil Rights (OCR), more than 113 million medical
records were compromised. Earlier last year Melbourne Health’s networks got
infected with a malware capable of keylogging and stealing passwords. In Febru-
ary 2016 Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Centre was struck with a devastating
ransomware, conveyed by simple Word document in an email attachment. The
most recent demonstration of hackers interest about eHealth data is a massive
sale of patients records on the dark web, where more than 650.000 tags were
auctioned off to the highest bidder.
What strikes the most is that we are dealing with a huge amount of data
weakly defended, easily accessible and highly valuable to malicious third parties.
People tend to link security to tangible money stored in bank accounts, but we’ve
witnessed a radical shift about what’s valuable in the black market, in the last
decade. Hackers do not just want our credit cards, they want the patterns of our
life.
3.2 IoT Medical Devices: How to Remotely Kill You
The IoT revolution is particularly relevant for a number of healthcare fields
of application, since networked devices make possible to monitor and deliver
necessary treatments to any remote patient, meaning that day-to-day and even
life-saving procedures can be promptly performed. Nowadays, devices like in-
sulin pumps, cochlear implants and cardiac defibrillators are used on a daily
basis to deliver remote assistance to a lot of patients. Furthermore, in the last
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years bigger devices like blood refrigeration units, CT scan systems and X-ray
systems are connected to the Internet, in order to check remotely their opera-
tional state and make whatever adjustment is needed (e.g., lower the blood unit
inside temperature).
Fig. 2. Percentage of firms executives that rate the IoT products, in their own
industry, highly resilient to cyber attacks [9].
Keeping in mind that, as we stated in Section 1, when something is con-
nected to the Internet it is inherently not secure, the other side of the coin is
that the IoT-based healthcare exposes the aforementioned life-saving procedures
to the public domain. Therefore, this exposure entails that “if it isn’t secure, it
isn’t safe” [21]. For the sake of clarity, Capgemini Consulting conducted an in-
vestigation in February 2015 [9] where firms executives were asked about the
resilience of IoT products in general, in their own opinion. Results shown in
Figure 2 show that medical devices are critically at the bottom of the survey,
with only a 10% of executives that believe that IoT devices are highly resilient to
cybercriminals. Indeed, various life-threatening vulnerabilities have been found
in a number of IoT devices. At least 5 models of intravenous drug pumps manu-
factured by Hospira, an Illinois firm that administers more than 400.000 devices
all over the world, recently showed critical vulnerabilities that could allow a
malicious attacker to alter the amount of drugs delivery to patients. Medtronic,
one of the world’s largest standalone medical technology development company,
manufactures an insulin pump that enables patients to autonomously manage
their blood glucose levels; sadly, the system does not encrypt the commands sent
to the pumps by patients, nor do authenticate the legitimacy of the user. Such
an uncontrolled system means that unauthorized third parties could intercept
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a legitimate command and replace it, delivering a deadly insulin dose to the
patient. Some companies that produce Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators
(ICDs), used to deliver shocks to patients going into cardiac arrest, use a Blue-
tooth stack to test their devices after the first implantation, but they use default
and weak passwords which makes their product easily hackable.
Similar problems have been found in blood refrigeration units, protected only
by a hardcoded password that could be deciphered by malicious attackers and
used to alter the refrigeration unit temperature, consequently wrecking the blood
provision.
Another attack could be struck by targeting CT scanning equipments and
altering the radiation exposure limits, killing a patient by administering a huge
amount of radiation. Even some X-ray systems have been proved to be vulner-
able, as they do not provide any kind of authentication when patients’ X-rays
are backed up in centralized storage units, nor log who views the images.
Bad security can be as dangerous as lack of security, as seen in May 2016
when Merge Hemo, a medical equipment used to supervise hearth catheterization
procedures, crashed due to a scan triggered by the antivirus software installed:
installing antivirus e antimalware software is not only insufficient, sometimes it
can even be hazardous if superficially done.
4 On the Need of Developing a Security Culture
Today technology is so sophisticated that counteracting outside threats requires
a high level of knowledge and a vast set of skills. This becomes even more chal-
lenging if security is mostly unheeded as it happens today, treated as a post-
ponable aspect of a product instead than a inherent and essential trait. And
while firms struggle to keep on track, hackers keep on gaining competence and
resources: as an example, ransomware victims receive easy and detailed instruc-
tions on how to unlock their devices, and sometimes hackers themselves provide
24/7 call centres, in case their targets should run into any kind of technical
difficulty. Shockingly, the support victims get from hackers is better than the
support they get from their own Internet Service Provider.
So, what are the recommendations that should be followed in designing more
secure IoT devices? How can we mitigate, if not solving, this security and privacy
disaster?
We believe that, to provide an answer, we first need to step back to the basic
question: what is the nature of the problem? Is it technological? Rephrasing, do
we have a lack of proper technology to protect IoT systems? Do we need new
security solutions?
Our (probably provocative) answer is no, we do not need technological inno-
vation. Or better, of course we do need that, as we do need government regu-
lation, but these are not the priority. The priority is instead education. Indeed,
what we actually miss is to develop an effective security culture, raising the lev-
els of awareness and understanding of the cyber risk and embedding “security-
aware” values and behaviours in our everyday life.
The Internet of Hackable Things 9
Security and trust are indeed also matter of education and method. For
example, in social networks algorithm to compute users trust exist [22], still
people need to rely on their own experience and understanding and should not
blindly follow computer suggestions. It is the integration of human understanding
and algorithms that always offer the best solutions.
To support the above argument, consider all the examples of IoT devices
mentioned in this paper (a summary is given in Table 1). It is noteworthy to
highlight that all the described vulnerabilities have the common characteristic
of being possible thanks to the naive approach that manufactures adopted in
the design phase of their products, approach that clearly shows how security is
merely sketched out or even neglected at all. Following basic and well known
security practices, it would have been possible to protect these devices against
all those cyber-attacks. This is something extremely important to understand.
For instance, just to provide another example supporting our argument, let us
consider the Mirai malware that operated in October 2016, achieving the largest
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack ever, approximately hitting the
targets with 1.2 Tbps of requests [23]. Mirai simply scans the Internet, looking
for vulnerable IoT devices to attack with a simple dictionary approach and, once
that access is gained, the device becomes a bot of a huge network ready to strike
a massive DDoS attack. Noticeably, the dictionary used by Mirai is filled with
a tiny number of entries, around 50 combinations of username/password, which
gives an idea of how little effort is put by firms into designing security for their
IoT devices, at the present moment. Again, what was the key issue making this
huge cyber attack possible? Was it a lack of technological innovation, for instance
a stronger authentication mechanism? Or a lack of a basic security culture, so
that we do not apply the technology we already have and that could actually
solve most of nowadays security vulnerabilities?
Security best practices recommend that a detailed risk analysis should be
done, in order to have a clear view of what are the actual cyber threats and
consequently choose the right approach to secure the devices. Moreover, device
security should be designed as an essential part of the product lifecycle and not as
a one-time issue. Once that the right path has been chosen for the new products,
already existing devices should be thoroughly tested, following a fairly simple
schedule like: automated scanning of web interfaces, reviewing of network traffic,
reviewing the need of physical ports (e.g., USB ports), reviewing authentication
and authorization processes, reviewing the interaction of devices with cloud and
mobile application counterparts (an example for health trackers is given in [17]).
In the end, what we have learned by this excursus is that the main problem
and concern with IoT security is that a security culture is nearly non-existent
in our society. It should sound obvious that the more the technology develops
and becomes pervasive in our lives, the more the security awareness should be
growing. But this is not happening, or it is happening at a too slow pace. In-
deed, while the concept of “computing” has rapidly and significantly evolved in
the last decades (from mainframes to personal computing to mobile and then
pervasive computing), the development of security has not followed the same
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Table 1. Examples of hacked IoT devices. “Weak security” means that the
device was easily breakable because of a lack of basic security protection mech-
anisms (details in the paper).
IoT Device Why Hacked
Tea kettles No security
Irons No security
Kitchen appliances No security
Printers Weak security
Networked light bulbs Weak security
Smart TVs Weak security
Baby monitors Weak security
Webcams Weak security
Thermostats No security
VoIP phones Weak security
Home alarm systems No security
Smart toilets No security
Smart cars Weak security
Drug infusion pumps Weak security
Insulin pumps No security
Implantable cardioverter defibrillators Weak security
X-Ray systems No security
Blood refrigeration units Weak security
CT scanning equipment No security
Heart surgery monitoring device Weak security
Fitness trackers Weak security
Hotel room doors Weak security
evolution. Nowadays, kids are able to use almost any mobile device like smart
phones, laptops, tablets, wearable devices and so on. On the other hand, they
have no concept of “security” or “privacy”. With the explosion of IoT, comput-
ing has become pervasive like never before. It’s time that also security becomes
so pervasive, starting from the development of a new security culture. This is
surely a long term goal that has several dimensions: developers must be educated
to adopt the best practices for securing their IoT devices within the particular
application domain; the general public must be educated to take security seri-
ously, too, which among other things will fix the problem of not changing default
password. This education effort, however, will surely need the support of both
innovation and government regulations, in order to enforce security when edu-
cation is not enough.
We are strongly convinced that education is the key to tackle a significant
number of today IoT security flaws. Therefore, if we raise the levels of cyber risks
understanding, both in the corporations and in the general end-users, maybe
what future holds would not look as daunting as it looks today. We call the
research community to this new exciting challenge.
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